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Abstract
When faced with a choice, people can normally select no option, i.e., defer choice. Previous research has investigated
when and why individuals defer choice, but has almost never looked at these questions when groups of people make
choices. Separate reasons predict that groups may be equally likely, more likely, or less likely than individuals to defer
choice. We re-analyzed some previously published data and conducted a new experiment to address this question. We
found that small groups of people tended to defer choice more often than their members would. Assuming that the
groups used a plurality rule but gave additional weight to individual preferences to defer choice allowed the groups’
responses to be predicted quite well. We discuss several possible explanations of these findings.
Keywords: group decision making, choice deferral, decision avoidance, decision delay.
1 Introduction
When given a choice, as well as being able to select one
option, people are often also able to select none of the
options, that is, to defer choice. Many of these choices
are not made alone, but by a group of people, be it family
members, friends, or colleagues. The current research
investigates who is more likely to defer choice: groups
making choices collectively or members of those groups
making choices individually.
It is possible to think of situations in which groups are
more likely to defer choice compared to their members
— just think of any time you were assigned to a com-
mittee of people who could not reach a decision, even
though each of the individual members had a clear pref-
erence. In contrast, some established principles of group
decision making suggest that groups may be less likely
to defer choice than their members. The phenomenon of
groupthink implies, for instance, that members who are
hesitant to make a decision as individuals are swayed by
the team spirit. As a consequence, groups may be more
prone than some of their members to make hasty deci-
sions rather than to delay a decision (Janis, 1972). Em-
pirical evidence concerning whether groups or individ-
uals are more likely to defer choice appears to be non-
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existent. We address this gap by reanalyzing data from
two previously published experiments and presenting a
new experiment.
1.1 Choice deferral
We refer to the behavior of not selecting one of a set of
available options as choice deferral, which Anderson de-
fined as “a situation in which an individual chooses not
to choose for the time being” (2003, p. 144). Deferring
choice may have different consequences in different situ-
ations: some or all of the options in the current set may
not be available in the future and/or new options may ap-
pear. According to Anderson, choice deferral is a sub-
category of the broader concept of decision avoidance,
which also contains behaviors like choosing the status
quo or default option, and taking no action. In this pa-
per, we concentrate on choice deferrals, and we leave the
question of whether our findings generalize to other types
of decision avoidance to future research.
Some research on individual decision making has in-
vestigated when and why individuals defer choice (e.g.,
Greenleaf & Lehmann, 1995). Although this body of re-
search is not extensive, one of the most important find-
ings is that people defer choice not only in situations in
which none of the available options is good enough but
also in situations in which they are not sure which option
is the best (e.g., Dhar, 1997). White and Hoffrage (2009,
see also White, Hoffrage, & Reisen, n.d.) used these two
independent reasons for deferring choice to explain the
counter-intuitive result that people sometimes do not se-
lect an option as often when more options are available
than when fewer options are available (Iyengar & Lepper,
2000; Schwartz, 2004; Shah & Wolford, 2007), although
others have had difficulties replicating this result (for a
review, see Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010).
239
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 3, April 2011 Group versus individual choice deferral 240
Choice deferral has very rarely been studied in groups.
As far as we are aware, no research directly addresses
whether groups are more likely to defer choice than their
members. Instances in which outcomes that could be de-
scribed as choice deferrals have been studied in group
decision making tasks mainly include hung juries and ne-
gotiation impasses. In jury decision making, individual
jurors do not defer choice, a jury only fails to reach a col-
lective decision and is said to be “hung” when the num-
ber of votes for either verdict fails to reach an externally-
imposed criterion. “Negotiation impasse” typically de-
scribes a situation in which neither of two parties in-
volved in a dispute wants to defer choice but nothing is
decided because they cannot reach an agreement. There-
fore, neither of these bodies of research is directly rele-
vant to our research question.
Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008) did study a
group decision task in which the group members could in-
dividually give a preference to defer choice as well as the
group as a whole. Their participants were each given dif-
ferent combinations of information about a set of job can-
didates. After making an individual decision about which
candidate to hire or if none of them should be hired, they
made the same decision as part of a group of three people.
The researchers never directly compared how often the
individuals chose to defer choice to how often the groups
deferred, but their data are amenable to such analyses, so
we report the results of a re-analysis of their data below
using the framework of Social Decision Scheme (SDS)
theory (Davis, 1973; Stasser, 1999).
1.2 Group decision strategies
Which strategy a group uses to reach a decision or judg-
ment often depends on the type of task they are perform-
ing. In inferential tasks in which there is a demonstrably
correct solution, groups often use a “truth-wins” strat-
egy: if one person can find the solution then she can
often convince the group to use her response (Lorge &
Solomon, 1955). In preferential tasks in which there
is no “correct” response (e.g., political elections), the
group must find a way to combine their individual pref-
erences. Groups may do this by using a preference-based
or an information-based strategy. The most prominent
preference-based strategy is the plurality rule (i.e., se-
lect the option that receives the most votes). In contrast,
when using information-based strategies, group members
exchange information and form a decision based on this
pooled information.
Social Decision Scheme theory (Davis, 1973; Stasser,
1999) can be used to investigate which type of deci-
sion rule groups of people use to reach collective de-
cisions. When using this framework, different decision
rules (called SDSs in this framework, e.g., a simple plu-
rality rule) are applied to the distribution of initial indi-
vidual preferences in each group. This yields a set of
predicted group responses for each decision rule, and the
fit between the predicted and observed group responses
using each rule can then be assessed.
The standard SDS technique is quite simplistic in that
each SDS (decision rule) is used merely to predict the
total frequency of each type of response based on the fre-
quency that each type of distribution of individual prefer-
ences was observed. The total frequencies of each type of
response predicted by each SDS are then compared to the
observed frequencies to see which SDS provides the best
fit (Stasser, 1999). We used such an implementation with
five different SDSs when analyzing the data from Nijstad
(2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008). When analyzing the
data from our new experiment, we used a more sophisti-
cated technique than the one we used to analyze the data
from Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008). The
more sophisticated technique involved using each of the
same five SDSs plus one additional rule to predict every
group response based on the observed distribution of in-
dividual preferences; we then compared the mean predic-
tion accuracy of each SDS across all groups to determine
which achieved the highest fit.
1.3 Predictions
One reason why we might predict groups to defer choice
more often than their members is that groups have at least
as many reasons to do so as individuals have. In previous
work, we have argued that individuals may defer choice
either because none of the options are good enough or be-
cause they are not sure which is the best (White & Hof-
frage, 2009; White et al., n.d.). Nijstad (2008) and Nijs-
tad and Kaps (2008) found evidence that groups may also
defer choice because different members prefer or dislike
different options. Groups may therefore defer choice due
to disagreement, which is something that cannot occur
when individuals make decisions alone. If groups have
more reasons to defer choice than their members have
then we may predict that groups will defer choice more
often. This can be restated as hypothesis 1:
H1: Groups will defer choice more frequently than
their members.
In contrast, one reason why we might predict groups to
defer choice less often than their members is that groups
can pool their knowledge together and reduce uncertainty.
This argument may apply not only on the group level,
but also for an individual member: discovering that other
people share one’s own opinion may reduce the amount
of subjective uncertainty in that opinion, thereby causing
each individual to be less likely to want to defer choice
after group discussion than before. Research investigat-
ing the difference in confidence between individuals and
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groups has indeed found this to be the case. Puncochar
and Fox (2004) found that groups were not only more
confident than individuals in their responses that were
correct but also in their responses that were wrong, al-
though this can at least partly be explained by the fact that
the groups’ responses were more likely to be correct than
those of individuals (see also Patalano & LeClair, 2011).
Stephenson, Clark, and Wade (1986) observed a similar
pattern of data and, in addition, found that four-person
groups were even more confident in their responses than
were two-person groups.
Thus, to the extent that uncertainty may lead to choice
deferrals, and groups have less uncertainty, then groups
may be less likely to defer choice. This can be restated as
hypothesis 2:
H2: Groups will defer choice less frequently than their
members.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are obviously contradictory, so we
looked at previously published data to assess which has
more support and also conducted a new experiment. We
first report our reanalysis of previously published data.
2 Re-analysis of Nijstad (2008) and
Nijstad and Kaps (2008)
2.1 Overview of method
The 90 participants in the experiment reported by Nijs-
tad (2008) and the 135 in that reported by Nijstad and
Kaps (2008) were generally Dutch university-aged stu-
dents (mean age = 21). There were three participants in
each group, and so a total of 75 groups across the two
experiments. Data about individual preferences were not
available for one group, so only 74 groups (222 partici-
pants) are included in the analysis.
Different participants received different subsets of the
available information about each of three job candidates.
The paradigm was similar to the hidden profile paradigm
(e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985) except that the combined in-
formation did not favor any one candidate more than any
other. The participants were first asked to individually
decide which candidate should be hired or whether none
of them should be hired and then became part of a three-
person group that made a group response. For both the in-
dividual and group responses, participants were told that
they should defer choice only “when they really thought
that none of the current candidates was suitable” (Nijstad,
2008, p. 528).
The original focus of the study and analyses was on
how the individuals’ positive or negative evaluations of
each option were combined to make group decisions, and
how these individual evaluations might cause the group
to decide to defer choice. Whereas the combined infor-
mation known collectively by all group members was the
same in all conditions within each study, which pieces
of information were presented to each person varied be-
tween groups. Specifically, in some groups, each person
had a positive opinion about at least one candidate, in
some groups each member had a negative opinion about
at least one candidate, and in other groups each member
had a neutral opinion about all candidates (Nijstad, 2008)
or a positive opinion for some and a negative opinion for
others (Nijstad & Kaps, 2008).
The main conclusion of the authors of this work was
that negative opinions about options often had a stronger
effect than positive opinions on the groups’ decisions,
and that this effect often caused choice deferral. (The
original publications provide additional details.) In our
re-analysis of their data, we ignore how the individuals’
initial preferences were manipulated and instead concen-
trate on (a) determining whether groups tended to defer
more or less than would be predicted by the initial pref-
erences and (b) which decision rules predict the group
response frequencies the best.
2.2 Results
The seven distinct types of distributions of initial individ-
ual preferences within a group are listed on the left-hand
side of Table 1. As an example, the upper four rows show
preference distribution type A in which all three group
members had an initial preference for option (candidate)
1. Because the option numbers are arbitrary, the situa-
tion of all members having a preference for option 1 is
effectively the same as when they all have a preference
for option 2, and so only one of these equivalent distribu-
tions is listed. The table also includes how often a group
who had that type of distribution chose each type of op-
tion, with effectively equivalent responses averaged to-
gether, and the group response frequencies predicted by
each Social Decision Scheme (SDS).
The total frequencies are included at the bottom of Ta-
ble 1, showing that 31 of the 74 groups (42%) deferred
choice, while the other 43 selected a candidate. This was
despite only 27 of the 222 participants (12%) having an
initial preference to defer choice. This finding suggests
that the group discussion resulted in a strong tendency to
defer choice that cannot be explained by simply counting
the initial preferences and applying a standard plurality
rule. To confirm this conjecture, we performed an anal-
ysis using the SDS framework to determine what type of
decision scheme might have been used.
SDS modeling allows one to predict how often each
type of response would be observed assuming that a cer-
tain decision scheme was used. Five possible decision
schemes are shown in Table 2, which includes a brief de-
scription of the rules used by each decision scheme and
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Table 1: The seven distinct types of individual preference distributions (first three columns), the observed frequency
of the corresponding group responses (fourth column, from the Experiments by Nijstad, 2008, and Nijstad & Kaps,
2008), and the frequencies predicted by each of five social decision schemes (last five columns).
Preference
distribution
type
Response
Number of
members
preferring
response
Observed
group
response
frequency
Predicted group response frequency
SDS 1 SDS 2 SDS 3 SDS 4 SDS 5
A Option 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Option 2 0 - - - - - -
Option 3 0 - - - - - -
Defer 0 - - - - - -
B Option 1 2 13 19 19 19 19 19
Option 2 1 1 - - - - -
Option 3 0 1 - - - - -
Defer 0 4 - - - - -
C Option 1 1 7 11 11 11 5.5 -
Option 2 1 7 11 11 11 5.5 -
Option 3 1 7 11 11 11 5.5 -
Defer 0 12 - - - 16.5 33
D Option 1 2 2 6 6 - - -
Option 2 0 - - - - - -
Option 3 0 - - - - - -
Defer 1 4 - - 6 6 6
E Option 1 1 1.5 2.7 - - - -
Option 2 1 1.5 2.7 - - - -
Option 3 0 - - - - - -
Defer 1 5 2.7 8 8 8 8
F Option 1 1 - - - - - -
Option 2 0 - - - - - -
Option 3 0 - - - - - -
Defer 2 5 5 5 5 5 5
G Option 1 0 - - - - - -
Option 2 0 - - - - - -
Option 3 0 - - - - - -
Defer 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total Select option 43 65.3 60 54 37.5 21
Defer 31 8.7 14 20 36.5 53
Note: Observed frequencies in italics denote average values. Observed and predicted frequencies of zero are
denoted as ‘-’ to improve readability.
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Table 2: Decision rules followed by each of the six Social Decision Schemes, their goodness-of-fit to the data from
Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008), and their prediction accuracy in the new experiment.
Nijstad (2008) &
Nijstad & Kaps
(2008)
New experiment
Name Decision rules χ
2 (1 df,
N=74) p
Prediction
accuracy
SDS 1 1) Plurality 65.5 <.001 81.5
2) If votes tied then choose randomly between tied options
SDS 2 1) Plurality 25.5 <.001 82.5%
2) If votes tied then
a) defer choice if it is one of the tied options
b) else choose randomly between tied options
SDS 3 1) Defer choice if it receives at least one vote 8.29 <.01 72.9%
2) Plurality
3) If votes tied then choose randomly between tied options
SDS 4 1) Defer choice if it receives at least one vote 1.64 .20 71.1%
2) Plurality
3) If votes tied then
a) half the time defer choice
b) half the time choose randomly between tied options
SDS 5 1) Defer choice if it receives at least one vote 32.2 <.001 69.3%
2) Plurality
3) If votes tied then defer choice
SDS 6 1) Majority 70.8%
2) If no majority then defer choice
Note. SDS 6 makes identical predictions to SDS 5 in the experiments by Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps
(2008) because all groups had only three members.
the results of a goodness-of-fit test comparing the total
predicted response frequencies to the total observed re-
sponse frequencies, which are given in the last two rows
of Table 1. Prediction accuracies for the data from our
new experiment are also included, which are explained in
the report of that experiment below.
SDS #1 does not have an elevated tendency towards de-
ferring choice. It simply predicts that the group response
would be that which has a plurality of initial preferences
(i.e., votes); if multiple responses are tied then it chooses
randomly between those. Because all groups contained
only three members in these experiments, the plurality
and majority rules made identical predictions. SDS #1
predicts that groups would defer choice only about 8.7
times and select an option 65.3 times, which is a very bad
fit to the observed frequencies of 31 and 43 times, respec-
tively, χ²(1) = 65.2, p < .001.
The other four SDSs have an increasing tendency to-
wards deferring choice. SDS #2 generally uses the plu-
rality rule, but, if there is a tie and if choice deferral is one
of the tied options, it predicts that choice would always
be deferred. This predicts there to be 14 group choice de-
ferrals and 60 option selections, which is still a poor fit,
χ²(1) = 25.5, p < .001. SDS #3 always predicts choice
to be deferred if at least one group member has an initial
preference to defer (even if the two other group members
both have a preference for the same option), otherwise the
plurality rule is used. This predicts there to be 20 choice
deferrals and 54 option selections, which yields a slightly
better fit, χ²(1) = 8.29, p < .01.
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SDS #4 is the same as SDS #3, but, if there is a tie with
all three options receiving one vote (and so choice defer-
ral receives no votes), then choice is deferred with a prob-
ability of one half. Thus, the predictions are halfway be-
tween those of SDS #3 and #5. This SDS predicts there to
be 36.5 choice deferrals and 37.5 option selections. The
observed frequencies of 31 and 43, respectively, were not
significantly different from these predicted frequencies,
χ²(1) = 1.64, p = .20. SDS #5 takes this idea to the ex-
treme, and so is the same as SDS #3 except that if there is
a tie with all three options receiving one vote then choice
is deferred every time. This predicts there to be 53 choice
deferrals and 21 option selections, which does not pro-
vide a good fit to the data, χ²(1) = 32.2, p < .001.
2.3 Discussion
In general, the groups deferred choice much more than
would be predicted based on using a simple plurality rule
to combine the initial individual preferences. A strong
tendency to defer choice was observed in the group re-
sponses, with the best-fitting model predicting that the
group would defer choice whenever at least one member
initially preferred to do so, and sometimes even when no-
body initially preferred the choice deferral option, but no
two people preferred the same option. The results of this
experiment clearly supported Hypothesis 1, which is that
groups will defer choice more than their members, and
did not support the antithesis, Hypothesis 2.
It is important to note that these statistical analyses are
sensitive to the relative frequencies of the different prefer-
ence distribution types. As a consequence, the results of
the inferential statistics may not be completely generaliz-
able to other situations and tasks. This was because the
information that each participant received was controlled
so that the distribution of initial preferences had certain
properties that may not be so common in other situations.
Specifically, situations in which each of the three group
members preferred a different option (this was the case
for 33 of the 74 groups) occurred far more frequently than
might be expected if the situation were real. The fact that
the groups collectively chose to defer choice quite often
in these situations, even when none of the members had
an initial preference to defer choice (this occurred in 12
of the 33 instances) is certainly interesting, but this may
not happen in other situations.
We therefore describe a new experiment below in
which a very different task and sample of participants was
used and every participant received the same information
about all options; this resulted in a very different pattern
of distributions of initial preferences. This new experi-
ment therefore provides a far more conservative test of
our main hypotheses.
3 New experiment
In this experiment, groups of two to eight people (mostly
children) viewed sets of options each described by sev-
eral attributes. We designed the task to be engaging for
people attending an “Open House” event at a Swiss Uni-
versity. We had one of several tents whose theme was
Homer’s Odyssey. Our cover story was that, after the bat-
tle at Troy, Ulysses and his crew needed to travel back to
Ithaca as quickly as possible. The voyage was split into
six smaller sea crossings between islands. The groups
had to choose a boat to use for each trip. The participants
first individually indicated which option they preferred
or whether they preferred to defer choice. They subse-
quently made the same decision as a group. Each group
made multiple such decisions and received a performance
score based on how good their chosen options turned out
to be.
Because the task involved multiple trials, we were able
to avoid a shortcoming of many other experiments on
choice deferral. Instead of choice deferral resulting in
a decision being completely avoided, in this experiment
deferring choice in one choice set meant that the decision
would be delayed to a future choice set, which adhered
to the definition of choice deferral that we stated at the
beginning of this paper: choice deferral is “a situation in
which an individual chooses not to choose for the time
being” (Anderson, 2003, p. 144).
3.1 Predictions
Our re-analysis of the experiments by Nijstad (2008) and
Nijstad and Kaps (2008) gave support to Hypothesis 1,
that groups defer choice more often than their members
would. This new experiment again tested this hypothesis
to see how robust the finding was when using a very dif-
ferent task and a very different sample of participants. We
also manipulated two variables that were likely to affect
the frequency with which choice would be deferred.
The first of the two main independent variables was the
size of the choice set. Some researchers have found that
people tend to select an option less often when more op-
tions are available than when fewer options are available
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Shah & Wolford, 2007). How-
ever, other researchers have had difficulty replicating this
result, and some have even observed the opposite effect
of people being more likely to select an option when more
are available (e.g., White & Hoffrage, 2009; for a review,
see Scheibehenne et al., 2010). Previous research there-
fore again leads to two contradictory hypotheses:
H3: Larger choice sets will result in more choice de-
ferrals than smaller choice sets.
H4: Larger choice sets will result in fewer choice de-
ferrals than smaller choice sets.
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The other main independent variable was the cost of
deferring choice. In most experiments that allow choice
to be deferred, doing so has no implications for the par-
ticipants. This is normally not the case when making real
decisions. In this experiment, in addition to the fact that
deferring choice in one choice set caused further choice
sets to be presented (from which an option was eventually
selected), in one condition we also implemented a cost of
deferring choice. We naturally expected higher costs of
deferring choice to decrease the number of choice defer-
rals:
H5: When there is a cost for deferring choice, choice
will be deferred less often than when there is no cost.
We manipulated two other variables: spokesperson
type and cue representation. We had no specific predic-
tions as to how these variables would affect choice defer-
ral, and because they in fact had small and non-significant
effects, we describe how we manipulated them in the
Methods section and include them in the statistical anal-
yses, but do not discuss them further.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
School groups came during the first day of the Open
House event, on which 248 people (126 male, 122 fe-
male; age range = 8–14 years, except for three teachers
aged 24 to 52, M = 11.1, Mdn = 11, SD = 1.1) partici-
pated in 50 groups (mean size = 4.96, range = 3–6). All
members of a given group were in the same class and so
knew each other.
The general public attended on the second and third
days, which mostly consisted of families with school-
aged children. There were 683 people (382 male, 301
female; age range = 5–72 years, M = 15.0, Mdn = 11, SD
= 11.9, 86 were≥ 18 years old) in 124 groups (mean size
= 5.51, range = 2–8). Some groups consisted of only one
party who knew each other, but most consisted of multi-
ple such parties.
The main reimbursement was the educational experi-
ence of learning how research in psychology may be con-
ducted and the enjoyment of playing the game. People
also had the possibility to enter a draw to win a digital
media player if they visited all of the tents in the section.
3.2.2 Materials and design
An experimenter sat at each of four tables in the tent.
At the end of each table was a computer monitor and in
the middle of the table there was a map on which Troy,
Ithaca, intervening islands, and the route to be taken were
shown. To depict the group’s progression through the
task, after each trip, a participant moved a model boat
on the map between the islands.
One of the participants was randomly assigned to be
the group’s spokesperson by rolling a die. The spokesper-
son type was manipulated by half of the groups being
randomly assigned to the captain condition, in which the
spokesperson was told to take advice from the rest of the
group, but also that he/she was ultimately responsible for
making the final group decision and announcing it to the
experimenter. In the other condition, the spokesperson
was told to assume the role of a communicator whose
role was simply to inform the experimenter of the group’s
collective response.
The boats in each choice set were described by four cue
values: wind power, rowing power, supply capacity, and
builder’s skill, which were displayed in a pictorial matrix
on the left-hand side of the monitor (see Figure 1). Each
cue value was determined randomly and independently
for each boat, with each value from one to four having
an equal probability (except that no two boats could have
identical sets of values). Each group was randomly as-
signed to one of the two cue representation conditions:
The cue values were given by either showing the corre-
sponding number of appropriate images (e.g., three sails
represented a value of three on wind power) or by show-
ing an image with the corresponding size (e.g., a very
small sail represented a value of one on wind power).
The choice set size was manipulated within-groups,
with each choice set consisting of three, six, or nine boats.
The first three choice sets in the test phase contained one
instance of each set size in a random order. Set size var-
ied randomly and independently in the subsequent choice
sets.
The total score of each boat was the sum of the four cue
values, all equally weighted (range = 4–16). If a boat was
selected, a red outline appeared around the selected boat
and all of the boats moved across the screen at a speed
that was determined partly by the boats’ total scores and
partly by random components. The time it took boats to
cross the screen was transformed into the number of days
that the trip took (M = 14.0 days, SD = 2.5, range = 8–
23). Aside from being given a reason why each of the
cues was predictive of speed, the participants were told
nothing about whether the cues were weighted or how
speed was computed.
On each island, the group could choose a boat from the
first set of boats that they saw or they could defer choice
and see additional sets of boats until they chose one. If
choice was deferred then it was not possible to return to
that choice set. The deferral cost was manipulated by
half of the groups being randomly assigned to the no-cost
condition, in which deferring choice cost nothing, and the
other half were in the one-day-cost condition, in which
deferring choice cost an extra day (because the new set of
boats was located in a different village that the crew had
to spend a day traveling to).
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the task used in the new experiment.
3.2.3 Procedure
The experimenters deferred choice in each of the first
three demonstration choice sets to ensure that participants
understood what the consequences of doing so were. The
experimenters did not say why choice might be deferred;
they merely introduced the option and explained its con-
sequences. During the fourth demonstration choice set,
they explained the purpose of the playing cards. Each
participant had a set of playing cards; each card showed
a boat with a number from one to nine, corresponding to
the numbers shown on the monitor, plus there was a card
labeled either “Another set of options” or “Another set
of options tomorrow” (depending on the deferral cost).
The participants used the cards at the start of each trial
to make individual responses by placing the card corre-
sponding to their choice face-down on the table. Once
all participants had placed a card on the table, the exper-
imenter asked them to turn the cards over and start dis-
cussing what the group response would be. After the four
demonstration choice sets (or five if the group response
was to defer choice in fourth set), the test phase began.
When the group selected a boat, the number of days
that the chosen boat took to make the trip was added to
the group’s total travel time. If a group in the one-day
cost condition deferred choice then one day was added to
their total time. The total time was constantly displayed
as a number in the top left of the screen plus a line of the
corresponding number of sun images next to that.
The school groups that came on the first day had to
move to another tent after 20 minutes and on the sec-
ond and third days we terminated the experiment after 30
minutes so that more people had the opportunity to par-
ticipate. New choice sets were presented in the test phase
until the group had chosen six boats or the time limit had
been reached. The mean number of choice sets responded
to was 5.8 (SD = 1.8), and ranged from 1 to 13. Almost
half of the groups (83 groups, or 47%) selected all six
boats necessary to complete the test phase (but the data
from nearly all groups was used in the analyses below).
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The main dependent variable was the deferral propor-
tion. For groups, this was computed as the number of
group deferrals divided by the number of choice sets seen
(ignoring the data from the demonstration choice sets).
This was computed in a similar way for each individual,
and then the average deferral proportion was taken across
all individuals within each group. The group deferral pro-
portion could then be compared to the mean individual
deferral proportion within that group and so the group
was used as the unit of analysis, and response source,
group versus individual, was a within-group independent
variable.
The participants completed two other brief tasks that
were independent of the current research, the results
of which are reported elsewhere (Antonakis & Dalgas,
2009; Hoffrage, Antonakis, White, Krings, & Palazzo,
n.d.).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Deferral proportion
We analyzed the deferral proportion using a mixed-
design ANOVA that included the within-group variables
of response source (group or individual) and choice set
size (three, six, or nine boats) and the between-group
variables of deferral cost (no-cost or one-day-cost), cue
representation (size or number), and spokesperson type
(captain or communicator) and the dependent variable of
deferral proportion. Out of the 174 groups, four were not
included in this analysis because they did not respond to
at least three choice sets, and so did not see one of each
choice set size.
Overall, the proportion of times that groups deferred
choice, 10.5%, was larger than that for the individuals,
8.7%, F (1, 162) = 6.66, p = .01; this was a small effect,
d = 0.2. There was a higher proportion of choice defer-
rals when there was no cost to deferring, 13.6%, rather
than a cost of one day, 5.5%, F (1, 162) = 24.4, p < .01;
this was a large effect, d = 0.76. Also, choice was more
frequently deferred when the choice set was smaller than
larger, F (2, 324) = 26.4, p < .001, which is an effect that
we observed in previous research and referred to as “the
allure of more choice” (White & Hoffrage, 2009; White
et al., n.d.).
The overall effect of response source was qualified by
a significant interaction with the effect of deferral cost, F
(1, 162) = 8.71, p < .01. This interaction is illustrated in
Figure 2 and was caused by groups deferring choice more
than individuals only in the no-cost condition, 15.5% and
11.7%, respectively, t (82) = 3.28, p = 0.002, which was a
small effect, d = 0.36; there was effectively no difference
in the one-day cost condition, 5.4 % and 5.7%, t (86) = –
0.31, p = 0.76. No other main effects or interactions were
Figure 2: Choice deferral proportion for groups and indi-
viduals in the new experiment.
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significant (all p values > .05).
The number of people in the group (range = 2–8) and
the median age of the group’s members (range = 5.5–
63 years) did not significantly relate (neither linearly nor
quadratically) to the proportion of times that groups or
individuals deferred choice (all |r|’s < 0.13, all p’s > .10).
3.3.2 Predicting group responses from individual re-
sponses
Because each group made multiple responses, we per-
formed a more sophisticated SDS analysis to compare the
performance of the different decision rules. We applied
the same five decision rules described above and listed in
Table 2, plus two baseline models, to each group’s sets of
responses. Instead of simply predicting the total number
of choice deferrals and option selections, we predicted
exactly which option would be chosen or if choice would
be deferred for each choice set for each group based on
the distribution of initial preferences, using each decision
rule. The proportion of correct predictions for each group
using each decision rule could then be compared. All 174
groups were included in these analyses.
As a baseline, predicting the group responses by ran-
domly choosing one of the available options or deferring
choice yielded a mean prediction accuracy of 16.6% (SD
= 2.4%). Basing the prediction of each group response
on a single random individual’s initial preference yielded
a mean accuracy of 65.6% (SD = 12.3%). Combining
all the individuals’ preferences using the simple plurality
rule, SDS #1, was significantly more accurate than using
just one individual’s response, with a prediction accuracy
of 81.5% (SD = 16.3%), t (173) = 18.8, p < .001.
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In the reanalysis of the Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and
Kaps (2008) data, we found that some of the decision
rules that involved a tendency to defer choice even when
it was not the plurality response fared better than the sim-
ple plurality rule. The same was somewhat true here. Re-
call that SDS #2 is the same as the plurality rule except
that when there is a tie then choice is always predicted
to be deferred when choice deferral is one of the tied re-
sponses. This decision scheme yielded a mean prediction
accuracy of 82.5% (SD = 16.7%), which is significantly
higher than the prediction accuracy of SDS #1, t (173) =
3.61, p < .001.
Although the difference in prediction accuracy be-
tween SDS #1 and SDS #2 is significant, the magnitude
is very small, only 1.0 percentage points. This was due
to the two sets of predictions being different only when
there was a tie and choice deferral was one of the tied re-
sponses. This was not an overly common situation in this
experiment, occurring in only 43 out of the 1004 choice
sets that were responded to across all 174 groups. Even
so, out of these 43 occurrences, choice was deferred 32
times (as SDS #2 would predict), which is significantly
more than the 18.4 times that would be expected if the
groups chose randomly between the tied responses (as
SDS #1 predicts), χ²(df =1, N = 43) = 17.6, p < .001.
The other three decision rules, SDS #3, #4, and #5,
all performed significantly worse than SDS #1, achiev-
ing mean prediction accuracies (SDs) of 72.9% (19.7%),
71.1% (20.3%), and 69.3% (21.4%), respectively, t (173)
= 6.45, 7.92, 9.1, respectively, all p values < .001.
We used one more SDS in this experiment. SDS #6
predicts that groups will go with the majority decision
if there is one (i.e., when one option receives more votes
than all other options combined) and predicts choice to be
deferred in all other situations. When there are only two
or three group members, which was always the case in
the experiments by Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps
(2008), then the predictions of this SDS are identical to
those of SDS #5. Most groups in this experiment had at
least four members, and so the predictions sometimes dif-
fered from those of SDS #5. However, it also performed
significantly worse than SDS #1, with a mean prediction
accuracy of 70.8% (SD = 22.4%), t (173) = 8.03, p < .001.
3.4 Discussion
When there was no cost to deferring choice, groups de-
ferred more often than their members. This effect was
not observed when there was a cost to deferring cost, but
this may have been due to a floor effect because defer-
ral rates were generally less than 10% in that condition.
Therefore, in the no-cost condition, the results supported
Hypothesis 1, which states that groups defer choice more
than their members, and we found no support for the an-
tithesis, Hypothesis 2, in any condition.
In addition to comparing the overall choice deferral
proportions for individuals and groups, we also analyzed
how well the individual responses predicted the group
responses for choice deferrals and boat selections. The
groups’ responses could be quite accurately predicted by
assuming that a plurality decision rule was used to com-
bine the preferences of the individuals. In addition to this,
a preference to defer choice appeared to receive more
weight than a preference to select one of the options;
this was particularly evident when looking at the cases in
which the same number of people opted to defer choice
as who chose a specific boat, in these cases the group typ-
ically deferred choice (on 32 of 43 such occasions).
The results also supported Hypothesis 4, which states
that larger choice sets will result in fewer deferrals than
smaller choice sets, and the antithesis, Hypothesis 3, was
not supported by the data. Finally, Hypothesis 5 was also
supported by the data: An increased cost of deferring
choice lead to fewer deferrals.
4 General discussion
The results of our experiment and of the experiments re-
ported by Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008)
generally lead to the same conclusion: Groups are in-
deed more likely to defer choice than would be predicted
based on their members’ initial preferences. Very dif-
ferent methodologies and participants were used in these
studies, but the findings were robust across these two set-
tings.
The tendency for groups to give more weight to ini-
tial preferences to defer choice than to other options was
more pronounced in the experiments by Nijstad (2008)
and Nijstad and Kaps (2008) than in our new experiment.
Specifically, we found that the social decision schemes
that fit the data from Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and
Kaps (2008) the best assumes that choice will be deferred
whenever at least one person has an initial preference to
do so or sometimes even when nobody has an initial pref-
erence to do so but everyone initially favors a different
option. In our new experiment, the tendency for groups to
defer choice more than would be predicted by the simple
plurality rule appeared only when there was a tied vote
and choice deferral was one of the tied responses. There
were not many such instances in this experiment, which
caused the difference between the group and individual
deferral rates to be relatively small.
Comparing the two sets of results presented here sug-
gests that the increased tendency for groups to defer
choice more than individuals may differ in magnitude be-
tween different tasks and samples, and investigating these
differences further would be an interesting avenue for fu-
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ture research. Furthermore, in the Predictions subsection
of the Introduction we hypothesized that groups may be
less likely to defer choice than individuals because groups
are able to reduce their uncertainty compared to that of
individuals due to groups being able to pool information
together and because the individuals within the group can
learn that other people share their (uncertain) opinion. In-
deed, research has shown that groups are more confident
in their responses than are individuals (e.g., Puncochar
& Fox, 2004). In addition, the phenomenon of group-
think implies that members who are hesitant to make a
decision as individuals are swayed by the team spirit. In
the experiments reported here, these factors appear have
not been as strong as those that caused groups to defer
choice more than individuals, but that is not to say that
in other paradigms, the relative strength of these factors
might be reversed, leading to results that are opposite to
those presented here. For instance, the fact that group
members first made individual responses before the group
discussion began may have muted some of the effects of
groupthink. We hope that future research might therefore
use other paradigms, materials, and procedures to explore
the robustness and to detect boundary conditions of the
present findings.
4.1 Explanations
It is not obvious why groups deferred choice more often
than their members, so we discuss several possible expla-
nations of this. None of these can account for all of the
reported data, but they all have their own merits, and it is
likely that not just one but a combination of these expla-
nations is correct.
An explanation that relies on the assumption that
groups used an information-based decision strategy
rather than a preference-based strategy is that choice de-
ferral may be easier to defend in a group discussion
and/or may be more difficult to attack than the selection
of a certain option. Other options can be compared to
each other on certain dimensions, because, for example,
an option may possess a superior value on one attribute
compared to a second option, while the second option
may be superior to the first on another attribute. Deferring
choice does not have specific values on certain attributes,
so attribute-wise comparisons are impossible; criticizing
choice deferral based on specific attributes is therefore
difficult. This explanation could be applied to both ex-
perimental paradigms reported here.
The explanation that deferring choice may be easier to
defend than is selecting a certain option is similar to a
phenomenon observed in jury decision making in which
there is a tendency towards acquittal rather than convic-
tion (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Even if the acquittal de-
cision has fewer or an equal number of initial jury votes
than a conviction decision, the acquittal decision is of-
ten eventually chosen, seemingly because it is easier to
defend on the grounds of there being reasonable doubt.
An alternative explanation of why groups deferred
choice more often than their members is that groups often
tend to be more risk-seeking than individuals (as was re-
ported by, among others, Johnson & Davis, 1972; Zajonc,
R. Wolosin, M. Wolosin, & Loh, 1970). However, this
explanation rests on the assumption that deferring choice
is a riskier behavior than is selecting one of the currently
available options. Deferring choice can be framed as the
riskier behavior because one does not know what will be
available in future choice sets, whereas one is fully aware
of the current options; deferring choice therefore results
in more uncertainty. However, deferring choice can also
be framed as the less risky behavior because if there are
no good options in the current choice set then choosing
even the best of these is risky because it may turn out
very bad; in contrast, deferring choice in these situations
is likely to yield a better (and so less “risky”) option in
a future choice set. The assumption that deferring choice
is the riskier behavior is therefore not necessarily valid
because which response is riskier depends on the exact
situation and the consequences of choosing one of the op-
tions and of deferring choice. Further research is there-
fore needed to know whether differences in risk attitudes
are at the root of our findings.
To determine the riskiness of deferring choice instead
of selecting one of the available options requires a full un-
derstanding of the task structure, which the participants
in our new experiment could not have achieved given
their limited exposure to it. If this had been possible then
participants could have determined the optimal behavior
given each choice set that would minimize the expected
total voyage time. In contrast, we were able to perform
this analysis for our new experiment, and it revealed that
it would have been rational to defer choice far more often
than either the individuals or groups did (ignoring all in-
direct costs of deferring choice). If some members were
able to infer this based on their limited knowledge of the
task structure then they may have been able to convince
the group to defer choice more than would be expected
based on the members’ initial preferences. Another pos-
sible explanation of our result that groups deferred choice
more than their members is therefore that a truth-wins
(information-based) decision rule was used by at least
some of the groups instead of a purely preference-based
strategy.
Although it would have been rational to defer choice
more than did the individuals or groups in our new ex-
periment, there was no response that could be described
as more “rational” in the experiments of Nijstad (2008)
and Nijstad and Kaps (2008). In their task, participants
had to select one of three job candidates or defer choice
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because none of them were good enough. Because no cri-
terion was given for what was good enough, it is difficult
to determine what the correct response would be in this
situation. Therefore, the fact that groups deferred choice
more than their members cannot be said to be any more
rational than the opposite pattern of behavior in these ex-
periments.
One final pair of explanations for why groups deferred
choice more often than individuals is based on the idea
that groups have more reasons to defer choice than in-
dividuals have. In previous work, we have argued that
individuals may defer choice either because none of the
options is good enough or because they are not sure which
is the best (White & Hoffrage, 2009; White et al., n.d.).
Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008) found evi-
dence that groups may also defer choice because differ-
ent members prefer or dislike different options. In these
situations, it appears that, even though each member may
be confident enough in his/her opinion, the group cannot
collectively reach a certain level of confidence in choos-
ing any specific option, and it may defer choice for this
reason. That is, the amount of variation between the opin-
ions of different group members may be predictive of the
probability that the option chosen by the group will be
the best of those available, and so groups could use the
heterogeneity of the members’ opinions as a proxy for
the expected accuracy of the decision. Groups may also
defer choice for a reason that is not applicable to indi-
viduals: by deferring choice, no members feel as if they
have “lost” the argument when the group chooses an op-
tion they did not prefer.
These latter two explanations, the amount of variation
in the individual preferences being a proxy for uncer-
tainty and deferring choice so that no members feel as
if they lost the argument, are supported by the data from
Nijstad (2008) and Nijstad and Kaps (2008). As shown
by summing together the frequencies listed for the pref-
erence distribution types B and C in Table 1, when the
three group members initially preferred different options,
but nobody initially preferred deferring choice, the group
deferred choice 16 out of 52 times (31%). In contrast,
the data from our new experiment do not support these
explanations. Even when two or more options were tied
for the most votes, but the option to defer choice was not
one of the tied options, then the groups almost never de-
ferred choice (they did so only 0.7% of the time). More
research is therefore needed to discover in which type
of tasks these reasons for groups to defer choice will be
more important, and in which they will be less important.
To summarize our discussion of possible explanations,
it is unclear whether the increased likelihood for groups
to defer choice is because it is more rational to do so,
because groups are more risk-seeking than individuals,
because the idea of deferring choice is easier to defend
than is selecting a specific option in a group situation,
or because groups sometimes cannot reach a consensus.
It may be that not just one but a combination of these
explanations captures the real cause, and more research
is needed to decide which is/are the most valid in which
situations. We hope that this paper will stimulate such
research so that we may start to understand this important
phenomenon better.
4.2 Implications
This research has implications for organizational decision
making. In most, if not all organizations, some decisions
are made by individuals and others by groups. Each of
these modes has advantages and disadvantages (for an
overview, see, e.g., Baron, 1995). Organizations differ
with respect to how many and which decisions are as-
signed to individuals versus to groups. In the military or
in emergency units such as fire brigades, surgery teams,
or police units where time is often crucial, decisions are
usually made by one person to ensure time efficiency. In
contrast, in organizations like the United Nations Secu-
rity Council or the World Health Organization, demo-
cratic processes and a balance of power are considered
to be of utmost importance, so major decisions are made
by groups of people that share responsibility. Most orga-
nizations contain elements of both extremes, and it is for
the design of decision mechanisms in such organizations
that our research has implications.
If groups are more prone to defer choice than are indi-
viduals, organizations that rely heavily on decisions made
by groups might have an in-built tendency to inertia and
to resist change. One cannot say whether or not this is
a good thing in general: On one hand, groups’ increased
tendency to defer choice may, for some cases, result in
better outcomes compared to the outcomes resulting from
individual decision making. Conversely, there will be
cases in which deferring choice and maintaining the sta-
tus quo has clear disadvantages. The design of organiza-
tional decision mechanisms should take groups’ elevated
tendency towards choice deferral into account, and exist-
ing organizations are well-advised to (re)consider which
kind of decisions should be given to individuals instead
of groups and what should be done in cases in which an
individual or a group defers making a decision.
References
Anderson, C. J. (2003). The psychology of doing noth-
ing: Forms of decision avoidance result from reason
and emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 139–167.
Antonakis, J. & Dalgas, O. (2009). Predicting elections:
Child’s play! Science, 323, 1183.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 3, April 2011 Group versus individual choice deferral 251
Baron, J. (1995). A theory of social decisions. Journal
for the Theory of Social Behavior, 25, 103–114.
Davis, J. H. (1973). Group decision and social interac-
tion: A theory of social decision schemes. Psycholog-
ical Review, 80, 97–125.
Dhar, R. (1997). Consumer preference for a no-choice
option. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 215–231.
Greenleaf, E. A. & Lehmann, D. R. (1995). Reasons for
substantial delay in consumer decision making. Jour-
nal of Consumer Research, 22, 186–199.
Hoffrage, U., Antonakis, J., White, C. M., Krings, F., &
Palazzo, G (n.d.). Take him or leave him: Children’s
decisions in an ethical dilemma situation. Working pa-
per, University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and
Economics.
Iyengar, S. S. & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice
is demotivating: Can one desire too much of a good
thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
79, 995–1006.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Johnson, C. D. & Davis, J. H. (1972). An equiprobabil-
ity model of risk-taking. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 8, 159–175.
Lorge, I. & Solomon, H. (1955). Two models of group
behavior in the solution of eureka-type problems. Psy-
chometrika, 20, 139–148.
MacCoun, R. J., & Kerr, N. L. (1988). Asymmetric in-
fluence in mock jury deliberation: Jurors’ bias for le-
niency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 21–33.
Nijstad, B. A. (2008). Choosing none of the above: Per-
sistence of negativity after group discussion and group
decision refusal. Group Processes and Intergroup Re-
lations, 11, 525–538.
Nijstad, B. A. & Kaps, S. C. (2008). Taking the easy
way out: Preference diversity, decision strategies, and
decision refusal in groups. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 94, 860–870.
Patalano, A. L., & LeClair, Z. (2011). The influence of
group decision making on indecisiveness-related deci-
sional confidence. Judgment and Decision Making, 6,
163–175.
Puncochar, J. M. & Fox, P. W. (2004). Confidence in indi-
vidual and group decision making: When “two heads”
are worse than one. Journal of Educational Psychol-
ogy, 96, 582–591.
Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R. & Todd, P. M. (2010).
Can there ever be too many options? A meta-analytic
review of choice overload. Journal of Consumer Re-
search, 37, 409–425.
Schwartz, B. (2004). The Paradox of Choice: Why More
is Less. Harper Perennial: New York, NY.
Shah, A. M. & Wolford, G. (2007). Buying behavior as a
function of parametric variation of number of choices.
Psychological Science, 18, 369–370.
Stasser, G. (1999). A primer of social decision scheme
theory: Models of group influence, competitive model-
testing, and prospective modeling. Organizational Be-
havior and Human Decision Processes, 80, 3–20.
Stasser, G. & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared in-
formation in group decision making: Biased informa-
tion sampling during discussion. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 48, 1467–1478.
Stephenson, G. M., Clark, N. K., & Wade, G. S. (1986).
Meetings make evidence? An experimental study of
collaborative and individual recall of a simulated po-
lice interrogation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 50, 1113–1122.
White, C. M., & Hoffrage, U. (2009). Testing the tyranny
of too much choice against the allure of more choice.
Psychology and Marketing, 26, 280–298.
White, C. M., Hoffrage, U., & Reisen, N. (n.d.). Choice
deferral can arise from absolute evaluation or relative
comparison. Working paper, University of Lausanne,
Faculty of Business and Economics.
Zajonc, R. B., Wolosin, R. J., Wolosin, M. A., & Loh, W.
D. (1970). Social facilitation and imitation in group
risk-taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 6, 26–46.
